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Abstract 
Terrorism has become the main international security challenge of the 21
st
 century. From a 
historical perspective, terrorism has always been a serious concern for governments and 
nation states. The modern threat posed by terrorism has a much wider scope because of its 
international character. The much bigger threat posed by modern terrorism can also be 
explained by technological innovations and the reliance of terror networks on social networks 
both to propagate their message and as a recruitment tool. Modern terrorism also tends to be 
much more indiscriminate in targeting its victims, and employs methods aimed at maximising 
the psychological and global impact of its attacks. Combating this global threat requires a 
coordinated international approach. However, the international response has been 
fragmentary. A preliminary legal challenge is that of finding a universally accepted definition 
for terrorism. This paper has as its main objective to critically assess the international legal 
framework for combating terrorism and the legal challenges involved in fighting terrorism. 
The main focus of the discussion will be on the international humanitarian and criminal law 
implications of the fight against terrorism. The concluding part of the paper will seek to make 
recommendations aimed at improving the international legal framework.  
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1. Introduction 
Random acts of terrorism have become commonplace in today‟s world. Most often the 
victims are innocent people who happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Terrorist 
acts are calculated not just to kill, maim or to destroy property. They are also intended by the 
perpetrators as a way of sending out a message. That message is one of inspiring fear in the 
minds of members of the public. From the terrorist‟s point of view this psychological element 
is very important and terrorist acts are often planned and executed in such a way as to 
maximise the element of fear. It is through the psychological element of fear that the 
perpetrators of acts of terror hope to achieve their stated objectives by influencing a change in 
government policy. Combating this modern day problem is in the interest of all nations and 
has become part of the global agenda. The search for effective solutions has been at the 
forefront of the agenda of the United Nations (UN) for quite some time. Under the auspices 
of the UN, Member States have negotiated and adopted the Terrorist Bombing Convention of 
1997, the Terrorist Financing Convention of 1999, and the 2005 Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
Convention. The UN Sixth Legal Committee and the Ad Hoc Committee which was 
established pursuant to UNGA Resolution 51/210 of 1996 are still working towards the 
negotiation and future adoption of a draft Comprehensive Convention on International 
Terrorism.  
 
Although States agree in principle on the pressing need and importance of eradicating 
international terrorism, there are still some disagreements on a number of important issues. 
These disagreements have turned out to be an obstacle in the search for a comprehensive 
approach. From a legal and political point of view, such differences concern: 
 The legal definition of terrorism; 
 The relationship between terrorism and freedom fighters or national liberation 
movements; and 
 The relationship between terrorism and the activities of States‟ armed forces during 
armed conflicts and in exercise of their official duties in defending the State from 
attack. 
 
Terrorism is, first and foremost, a method. It is a method of belligerency which used in times 
of peace as well as in times of conflict. But it is not considered to a legal method of 
conducting warfare. A terrorist organisation can therefore be defined as an illicit or 
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clandestine group which generally consists of planners, financiers, trainers, combatants and 
bombers. From the point of view of internal organisation, a terrorist group can have various 
structures such as an identifiable vertical hierarchy of command or a horizontal structure 
where leaders are not easily identifiable. It could equally have a cell structure where the 
perpetrators of terrorist acts can operate as so-called „lone wolves‟. Terrorism employs as its 
main method of combat the concept of asymmetric warfare. Asymmetric warfare refers to the 
use of random and unpredictable patterns of violence by a weak group (i.e., one with a 
smaller force) against a stronger power (i.e., military, government or even society in general). 
The strategy employed is based on the element of surprise.  
 
Asymmetrical warfare is therefore fought between grossly unequal sides in terms of resources 
and manpower. It is for this reason that the less powerful force does not subscribe to the 
conventional rules of warfare. It knows fully well that it cannot win by conventional means or 
tactics. The underlying philosophy of asymmetric warfare is thus based on the use of 
unexpected and unconventional tactics in combat. This is similar to the notion of war without 
front lines. From the point of view of governments it is a war waged in the shadows against 
an unidentifiable and shadowy enemy. Despite all the information gathering efforts by the 
intelligence agencies, there is never any clear understanding on the part of governments of 
where the next strike will take place or where the war will lead or how it would end.
1
 
 
2. Combating International Terrorism: Legal Obstacles to Developing an Effective 
Enforcement System. 
 
2.1   Historical Perspective 
One of the key obstacles standing in the way of the development of an effective legal and 
enforcement framework for combating international terrorism lies in the difficulty of defining 
the term „terrorism‟. Within the term „terrorism‟ resides the word „terror‟. Terror comes from 
the latin term „terrere‟, which literarily means to „frighten‟ or to „tremble‟. When coupled 
with the French suffix „isme‟ which means „to practice‟, the word „terrorism‟ becomes akin to 
„causing fright‟ or „to cause trembling‟. Trembling and frightening here are synonyms for 
fear, panic, and anxiety- in other words, terror. The word „terror‟ is deemed to be over 2,100 
                                                          
1
 Hoge, James F., Jr., & Rose, Gideon (2001), How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War. 
New York: Public Affairs; Mansdorf, Irwin J., & Kedar, Mordechai (2008), The Psychological 
Asymmetry of Islamist Warfare. Middle East Quarterly, 15(2), 37–44; White, Jonathan R. (2011), 
Terrorism & Homeland Security (7th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
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years old and can be sourced to ancient Rome. In ancient Rome, the „terrre cimbricus‟ 
described the general panic following the state of emergency which was decreed in response 
to the savage invasion of Rome by the Cimbri tribe in 105 BCE.
2 
 
The modern version of the word terrorism can be traced to period of the French Revolution‟s 
Reign of Terror which lasted from 1793 to 1794. During this period of the French Revolution 
a group of rebels known as the Jacobeans used the term „reign of terror‟ to describe their own 
actions. It would seem that their motive was to instill fear in their political opponents, 
especially with their proclamation through the National Convention in September 1793 that 
terror was going to be the „order of the day‟.  
 
The Reign of Terror was in effect a campaign of large-scale State-sponsored violence which 
claimed the lives of more than 16,000 in a period of just one year. However, its perpetrators 
may not have seen it that way. Presaging the thinking of modern day terrorists, the Jacobean 
leader Maximilien Robespierre declared in 1794 that „terror is nothing other than justice, 
prompt, severe, [and] inflexible‟. This view was in effect the definition of terrorism 
according to the Jacobeans. The very first official definition of terrorism in French was 
provided several years later. In 1798, the Académie Française issued the first official 
definition of terrorism as the „système, régime de la terreur‟ (i.e., method or system for 
causing terror). The English version of the word terrorism or terrorist can be attributed to Sir 
Edmund Burke who, having witnessed personally some of the excesses of the French 
revolution while he was in France, warned about “thousands of those hell hounds called 
terrorists.”
3 
 
 
2.2 The Problem of  Attaining a Generally Accepted Definition for  
‘Terrorism’  
Whereas the Reign of Terror was a product of the French government, modern terrorism 
denotes the killing of humans by non-government political actors for various reasons - 
usually as a way of making a political statement. Beyond this generic view it is difficult to 
                                                          
2
 Burgess, Mark (2003), A Brief History of Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense 
Information (CDI); Tuman, Joseph S. (2009), Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of 
Terrorism (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage. 
3
 Burke, Edmund (1790), Reflections on the Revolution in France (Ed. C. C. O‟Brien, 1969, London: 
Penguin Books); Shane, Scott (2010, April 3). Words as Weapons: Dropping the “Terrorism” Bomb. 
The New York Times, p. WK1; Tuman, Joseph S. (2003). Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical 
Dimensions of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage. 
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pinpoint a precise definition of the modern term „terrorism‟. Many governments are reluctant 
to agree on a precise definition of the term. This is because they are concerned about the 
potential implications and likely political ramifications of adopting a precise or specific 
definition. In certain countries, the word „terrorism‟ has even become synonymous or 
associated with political opposition to the State. For instance, the Chinese government press 
frequently refers to Tibetan Buddhists as „vicious terrorists‟, even though the group is largely 
known to be pacifist. In Zimbabwe, the ruling party and State owned press has a similar view 
of the opposition party.
4 
 
The problem of finding a precise legal definition has thus been confounded and made more 
difficult by the fact that politically the word „terrorism‟ has become a pejorative  or 
derogatory term which is frequently employed as a disapproving label aimed at discrediting 
political enemies. In using the term „terrorism‟ for political ends, some governments aim to 
categorize the actions of the opposition and political dissidents as evil and lacking human 
compassion. The psychological element of fear has itself raised terrorism to a status which is 
considered worse than war, torture or murder,
5
 hence the frequent use of the term to gain 
political dividends.
 
 
 
One of the unfortunate by-products of the misuse of the word „terrorism‟ for political ends is 
that it has led to a proliferation of definitions for the term. Studies have found at least 212 
definitions of the word „terrorism‟ which are in use around the world, with 90 of these 
recurrently used by governments and other institutions.
6
 It is against this background that 
Schmid and Jongman decided to adopt a social scientific to finding a definition for terrorism 
by collating over a hundred academic and official definitions of the term and examining them 
in order to identify the main components – in other words, a „content analysis‟ of the 
definitions of terrorism.
7
 They discovered that the concept of „violence‟ was present in 83.5% 
of the definitions; the achievement of „political goals‟ featured in 65% of definitions, with the 
                                                          
4
 International Bar Association (2003), International Terrorism: Legal Challenges and Responses. 
Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers; Moeller, Susan D. (2002). A Hierarchy of Innocence: The 
Media‟s Use of Children in the Telling of International News. The International Journal of 
Press/Politics, 7(1), 36–56. 
5
 White, Jonathan R. (2011), Terrorism & Homeland Security (7th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
6
 Simon, Jeffrey D. (1994), The Terrorist Trap. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
7
 Schmid, Alex, & Jongman, Albert (1988),, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, 
Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature. Amsterdam: North Holland, Transaction Books.  
8. Berg, Bruce L. (2009), Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (7th ed.). Boston: 
Allyn & Bacon. 
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causing of „fear and terror‟ in 51%; arbitrariness and indiscriminate targeting featured in 21% 
of definitions, and the victimization of civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, or outsiders in 
17.5%. Taking this process further, Merari found that in the United States, Britain and 
Germany there are three common elements that exist in the legal definitions of terrorism of 
those countries. These are: (1) the use of violence, (2) political objectives, and (3) the aim of 
propagating fear in a target population.
8
 
 
2.3.  Definitions by various Institutions 
From an institutional perspective, the U.S. Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the 
calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended 
to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally 
political, religious, or ideological.”
9 
 The U.S. Department of State, on the other hand, refers 
to terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents.”
10
 The Arab 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism defines terrorism is “any act or threat of 
violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or 
collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming 
them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the 
environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, 
or seeking to jeopardize a national resource.”
11
 The UK approach, which is contained in the 
Terrorism Act of 2000, is quite detail and includes references to threats or actions which can 
lead to serious risk of harm to public safety or damage to property, with the motivation 
behind such threats or actions consisting of an attempt to influence the policies of 
governments or those of international organisations.
12
 
 
What these various definitions illustrate is that there are problems in attaining an all-inclusive 
definition for terrorism, even within the same jurisdiction such as the United States where 
                                                          
8
 Merari, Ariel (1993), Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency. Terrorism and Political Violence, 5(4), 
213–251. 
9
 Joint Chiefs of Staff DOD (2008), Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms. Washington, D.C.: DOD. 
10
 U.S. Department of State (1996), Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of State. 
11
 Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (1998), Arab Convention on Terrorism. Cairo: 
Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior and the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice. 
12
 Terrorism Act 2000, Section 1. 
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government departments such as the Department of Defense and the US State Department 
have each formulated their own definitions. Attempts to define terrorism can therefore 
become a complicated and politically inclined exercise. Terrorism is a concept that defies 
objective definition. This in turn means that it can be difficult to objectively and specifically 
identify who is a terrorist especially where it cannot be proven that the suspect has committed 
an act of terror. And while some definitions seem to satisfy the requirements of clarity and 
precision, others are lacking important criteria such as global connections, ideological roots, 
etc. 
 
The discussion above illustrates that when viewed from a global perspective of the current 
„war against terror‟, there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. What we have at 
best is a „most generally accepted‟ definition. From a generally accepted point of view, 
terrorism can be said to be the use of violence to create fear and anxiety (i.e., terror, psychic 
fear) for political, religious, or ideological reasons. The intended or preferred targets of 
terrorists are most often non-combatant civilian populations and iconic symbols of the State – 
i.e. „soft targets‟ in line with their preferred strategy of asymmetrical warfare. The objective 
is usually to achieve the greatest attainable publicity for a group or its cause, and to create 
long term fear among the population in the process.  
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3 The Potential Impact of International Humanitarian Law on the Fight Against 
Terrorism: ‘Signature Strikes’  
 
From a strategic and military point of view, the „war against terror‟ has been conducted, and 
is still being conducted, both openly and covertly. When used on the international stage as a 
tool to fight terrorism, covert operations raised a number of questions relating to the 
international humanitarian laws governing armed conflict. Such operations also have 
implications for international criminal law if covert actions are considered to amount to war 
crimes. Foremost amongst the covert operations which have raised the most concern among 
jurists are strikes carried out by drones against militant targets. From a legal point of view 
such strikes can be classified into two categories:   (a) direct or „personality‟ strikes where the 
identity of the target or victim is known to the assailant; and (b) „signature strikes‟ in which 
the identity of the target is not known but the suspect is deemed to exhibit the „signature 
behaviour‟ of a combatant or terrorist – in other words, the target displays suspicious patterns 
of behaviour which are deemed to correspond to the behaviour of a terrorist. 
 
Signature strike targets are usually males between 20-40 years of age (i.e. males of combat 
age). The problem with „signature policies‟ is that there have been a number of high profile 
cases in Afghanistan and Pakistan in which the victims of US signature strikes have turned 
out not to be combatants or terrorists but civilians. In a well-publicised incident which took 
place on 17 March, 2011, a meeting of tribal leaders or „jirga‟ was targeted in the town of 
Datta Khel in the Waziristan province of Pakistan with the loss of 42 lives.  The question then 
is whether such incidents which involve the killing of civilians who have been mistaken for 
terrorists amount to a breach of international humanitarian law, and therefore a possible war 
crime. It has to be said that the design, planning and execution of signature policies in the war 
against terror is of itself an exercise fraught with great difficulty from a strategic, military and 
technical point of view. There are also political considerations and legal obstacles which need 
to be addressed before signature policies can be implemented. The international legal 
implications of the use of signature strikes in the „war against terror‟ will be examined in 
detail in the sections below. 
 
3.1.  The International Humanitarian Law Principle of ‘Distinction’ 
The overwhelming view, especially amongst human rights lawyers, is that signature strikes 
are tantamount to illegal targeting, and that civilian deaths are the inevitable consequence of 
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such signature policies. This conclusion is based on the occasionally erroneous assumptions 
that can be made in the course of executing signature policies. There is also the problem 
relating to the technical limitations of drone operations, especially in relation to correctly 
identifying legitimate military targets or objectives.
13
 A combination of these two facts and 
their contribution towards erroneous targeting of civilians thus raises the question as to 
whether signature strikes are potentially a breach of one of the most fundamental principles 
of international humanitarian law, the „principle of distinction‟ which has at its main 
objective the protection of civilians in times of armed conflict. In an advisory opinion the 
International Court of Justice
14
 has expressed the view that the principle of distinction is 
fundamental to international humanitarian law and is considered to be a cardinal rule.  
 
The principle of distinction requires belligerents to distinguish between military targets and 
civilian objects. Article 3 (which is common to the Geneva Conventions
15
) is considered to 
be a miniature convention in itself. This article provides basic protections for civilians and 
individuals who are hors de combat
16
 and applies similarly to international and non-
international armed conflicts. The principle of distinction thus requires that civilians and 
civilian targets must not be the object of an attack. It is therefore a principle of importance 
and relevance when considering the legality or otherwise of signature strikes with the use of 
drones within the context of international humanitarian law. 
 
3.2.  The Protection of Civilians under the Principle of Distinction 
During armed conflict individuals who may be directly attacked or targeted are either 
members of an organised armed group or civilians who for such a time take a direct part in 
hostilities (DPH).
17
  The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) takes the position 
that members of an organised armed group are considered as maintaining a continuous 
combatant function (CCF). Such is the case where an individual has a longstanding 
assimilation into or association with an organised armed group in that they have been 
                                                          
13
 International Secretariat, “Will I Be Next?” US Drone Strikes In Pakistan‟ (Amnesty International 
Publications, 2013) <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA33/013/2013/en/041c08cb-fb54-
47b3-b3fe-a72c9169e487/asa330132013en.pdf>  
14
 „Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons‟ (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports 1996 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=09&case=95> 
15
 Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
16
 Meaning „Outside the fight‟ 
17
 International Committee of the Red Cross („ICRC‟) „Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law‟ (2008) 90 International Review of 
the Red Cross 872, 991 at 1002. 
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recruited, trained and equipped for purposes of direct engagement in hostilities in a 
continuous manner on behalf of the armed group as opposed to spontaneous, sporadic and 
unorganised participation. Members of an armed group may be the object of an attack 
anytime and anywhere.
18
  They are generally regarded as legitimate military targets unless 
they surrender, become hors de combat, retire or re-integrate back into civilian life.
19
 It is 
thus important to distinguish individuals taking a direct part in hostilities (who are considered 
to have civilian status when they cease to take such a part) from members of an organised 
armed group with a continuing combatant function (who at all times can be subject to an 
attack). 
 
US military policy has historically and in practice held that all the participants of terrorist 
organisations such as Al-Qaeda and its associated forces are factually exercising a continuing 
combatant function and that by virtue of this membership status they are targetable anywhere 
and at any time.
20
 However, depending on the organisation and its nature, membership 
criteria requirements can be differentiated into various categories. In traditional state armed 
forces, membership is based on the employment of a uniformed individual within the 
organisation. As such members are easily identifiable.  However in non-state, non-uniformed 
combatant groups, a more appropriate criterion for identifying membership would be a 
functional one in that an individual takes and/or gives orders in a central and hierarchical 
chain of command.
21
 If the group is purely a military organisation similar to a traditional state 
army in that their main role is militant in nature, it shall be a lawful military objective. An 
example of this type of group would be Islamic State. Even so direct targeting of such a 
group will be limited to exclusively military objects and installations that are not civilian 
objects.  
 
                                                          
18
 ICRC, „Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law‟ (2008) 90 International Law Review of the Red Cross 872, 991 at 
1006 – 1007: See; Geoffrey S Corn and others „The Law of Armed Conflict: An Operational 
Approach‟ (Wolters Kluwer Law and Business, 2012), Chapters 5-6. 
19
 ICRC, „Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law‟ (2008) 90 International Law Review of the Red Cross 872, 991 
20
 Jens David Ohlin „Is Jus in Bello in Crisis‟ JICJ 11(1) (2013) 27-45. 
21
 ICRC, „Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law‟ (2008) 90 International Law Review of the Red Cross 872, 991. 
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Article 51(3) of API provides that civilians are not targetable unless at a time when they are 
taking a direct part in hostilities.
22
  The ICRC guide provides that a civilian can be considered 
to be taking a direct part in hostilities if the act he is performing is likely to significantly 
affect the military operations or capacity of a party to the armed conflict, or if his actions 
inflict harm on persons or objects protected from direct attack. This does not require the 
materialisation of harm, but an objective likelihood of it, so the threshold must be determined 
on the harm likely to occur or reasonably expected to occur from an act in such a situation. 
When an act is reasonably expected to adversely affect military operations or the military 
capacity of a party to the conflict it would have satisfied the threshold requirement and the 
person engaging in the said act can thus become a legitimate target of a signature policy.
23
 
 
In order to be taking a direct part in hostilities the action must have a direct causal link 
between a specific act and the harm expected from the act. The act must form an essential 
part of such an organised military operation. It should be noted that one can take a „direct‟ 
part in hostilities or an „indirect‟ part. Participation on an indirect basis involves taking part in 
war sustaining activities as opposed to directly contributing to the general war effort. With 
direct participation  an individual actually conducts hostilities which bring about the 
materialisation of the threshold of harm required, whereas indirect participation only 
contributes to a mere maintenance or build-up of the capacity required.
24
 For direct 
participation there should be a sufficiently close causal link between the act and resulting 
harm. It should be in one causal step as opposed to a gradual build-up of actions. 
 
In order to be taking a direct part in  
hostilities there must be a belligerent nexus or connection. This requirement is met when an 
act is specifically designed to cause the required direct harm in support of one belligerent to 
the detriment of another. To establish the belligerent nexus is a difficult task but one should 
deduce from objectively verifiable factors or evidence whether the conduct of a civilian under 
any given circumstances, time and place can reasonably be seen to be an act in support of one 
party to the detriment of another by directly causing harm to the latter, and thus meeting the 
                                                          
22
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 („API‟) 
23
 ICRC, „Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law‟ (2008) 90 International Law Review of the Red Cross 872, 991 at 
1016 – 1019. 
24
 Note: Empirically both the general war effort and war sustaining activities may ultimately result in 
the harm required to attain the threshold required. 
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required threshold.
25
 When applied together, the three requirements based on the threshold of 
harm, direct causation and belligerent nexus enable an effective distinction to be made 
between purely civilians and civilian objects, as opposed to civilians and civilian objects 
which are taking a direct part in hostilities (i.e. civilian DPH). Where the former is protected 
under the international humanitarian law principle of distinction, the latter is not and can thus 
become the target of a signature policy when embarking on a DPH function. 
 
As seen above the principle of distinction is a cardinal rule of international humanitarian law 
which provides protection for civilians from attack. Article 57(2) of API provides that if a 
belligerent plans or decides to attack a target, there is a duty to ensure that the object of the 
attack is not a civilian or a civilian object.
26
 If there is any doubt whatsoever as to whether an 
individual is a civilian, Article 50(1) of API lays down a presumption to the effect that the 
individual should be considered to be a civilian and therefore not subject to an attack.
27
 
Similarly this presumption applies to objects such as places of worship, houses or other 
dwellings and facilities which are habitually used in a civilian capacity.
28
 
 
One of the legal problems in this area concerns the difficulty of defining who a civilian or 
civilian object is in the context of armed conflict. So far the focus has been on defining what 
a military objective is for the purposes of providing clarity as to what may be legally 
targeted.
29
 Article 52(2) of API provides that attacks are strictly limited to military objectives. 
Military objectives are limited to objects that by their “… nature, location, purpose or use… 
[make an effective contribution to the military action] …and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization… [would offer] …a definite military advantage.”
30
  
 
Viewed from the perspective of the principle of distinction, the problem with „signature 
strikes‟ policies stems from the fact that the US, for instance, views all of Al-Qaeda 
                                                          
25
 ICRC, „Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law‟ (2008) 90 International Law Review of the Red Cross 872, 991 at 
1025 - 1030 
26
 API, article 57(2) 
27
 API, article 50(1) 
28
 API, article 52(3) 
29
 Geoffrey S Corn „Targeting Command Judgement, and a Proposed Quantum of Information 
Component: A Fourth Amendment Lesson in Contextual Reasonableness‟ (2012) 77 Brook L Rev 2, 
437. 
30
 API, article 52(2): Note; See API, article 43 - members of an armed force are military objects for 
the purposes of IHL. 
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operatives and its associated forces as purely military objectives regardless of the requirement 
to distinguish individuals who hold a continuing combatant function membership status and 
civilians or civilian objects that come under the category of taking a direct part in hostilities.
31
 
Al-Qaeda at its core is widely regarded to be an exclusively military or combatant 
organisation. However, some Al-Qaeda affiliated groups such as the Somali group Al-
Shabaab are not. Al-Shabaab engages in Islamic insurgencies mainly in Somalia. Al-Shabaab 
also engages in civil matters, governance and has a mix of civilian and military 
functionalities.
32
 There are many Al-Shabaab operatives who hold exclusively administrative 
or judicial offices and functions – civilian membership of the group. 
 
In line with the principle of distinction, Article 50(3) of API provides that the presence of a 
military objective does not deprive the civilian population within the area of its civilian status 
and protection from direct attack.
33
 However, Article 51(7) of API does not confer immunity 
on an area in order to protect it from being targeted due to the presence of a civilian 
population in the area.
34
 Read together there seems to be an inherent contradiction in these 
two provisions. However, it ought to be noted that there are some in-built precautionary 
measures in Article 57(2) of API which stipulate that an attack should be cancelled or 
suspended where such an attack would be excessive to the direct military advantage expected 
because it would cause incidental loss of life, injury to life, or damage to objects that hold 
civilian status
35
 - i.e. if the potential for collateral damage is seen to outweigh the military 
gains from an attack, then such an attack ought to be aborted.  
 
The principle of distinction thus clearly establishes the threshold for what kinds of attacks are 
acceptable when dealing with different categories of persons or with a mix of civilian and 
military organisations. The principle of distinction, through its objective which is to protect 
civilians in times of conflict, requires civilian status presumptions and verifications of targets 
when in doubt. This implies that assailants must gather sufficient and reliable evidence 
                                                          
31
 Jens David Ohlin, „Is Jus in Bello in Crisis‟ JICJ 11(1) (2013) 27- 45 
32
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regarding the groups being targeted and must exercise the utmost duty of care towards the 
civilian population. 
 
4. The Degree of Evidence Required 
A commander
36
  is not expected to have personal knowledge of a military objective that is 
about to be the object of an attack, and must rely on information provided to him or her from 
another source. In case the commanding officer is in doubt as to the precise nature of an 
object, he or she should request additional information in order to determine whether the 
object is of military interest.
37
 However, the selection of an object of attack remains the 
decision of the commanding officer, based on his knowledge and the information available to 
him. The value to be placed on the information provided to him is to be left to the expertise 
and discretion of the commanding officer as long as he exercises this discretion reasonably on 
the basis of the available evidence.
38
 
 
When deciding whether a decision was reasonable, a minimum amount or quantum of 
information is required on the basis of which such a decision can be made. However, there is 
no defined standard for determining the amount of evidence or information which would 
suffice as the basis for making a reasonable decision by a commander. This raises the 
question as to what amount of „minimum‟ information or evidence is required in order to 
render a decision reasonable for the purposes of establishing a target as a military objective.
39
 
 
Under international criminal law if an attack is perpetrated on civilians or civilian objects 
knowingly and intentionally, then clearly it is illegal under Article 8 of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court 1998 („ICCSt‟).
40
 Any commander who wilfully chooses, or 
closes his eyes to information about directly targeting civilians or civilian objects, has in 
effect violated principle of distinction. The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable 
                                                          
36
 Note: use of „commanding officer‟ or „operational commander‟ or „commander‟ should be 
interpreted as any individual within an organised armed force‟s operational chain of command with 
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 Geoffrey S Corn „Targeting Command Judgement, and a Proposed Quantum of Information 
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doubt
41
 that there is no rational justification for viewing the target as a lawful military 
objective. Proof of intent will require establishing that the decision to attack the target was 
unreasonable and amounted to improper conduct on the part of the commanding officer.
42
  
 
5. Signature Strike Policies 
Under the „signature policy‟ concept an individual may be lawfully targeted based on their 
behaviour.
43
 This is because international humanitarian law has recently taken a shift from 
status-based targeting to conduct-based targeting.
44
 Signature policies can thus be said to be 
broadly in line with international humanitarian law. However, the failure of international 
humanitarian law to address issues regarding the amount or quantum of information for 
required for distinguishing targets means that even when individuals are targeted, the 
determination of whether the decision was reasonable does not rest on a precise amount of 
evidence. This dilutes the process of pinpointing when there is sufficient evidence to 
relinquish any civilian protection for the purpose of certifying that the target is exclusively or 
at such a time engaged in direct military activity and therefore is legally subject to attack.  
 
As seen above, the view of the US government is that Al-Qaeda and its associated forces are 
exclusively military organisations by nature. The assumption, therefore, is that these 
organisations only consist of members who are preforming a continuing combat function. 
Such a broad assumption creates the potential for some of the signature policies for drone 
strikes carried out by the US to be considered illegal under international humanitarian law.
45
  
It is important to recall that any individual who holds the status of continuing combating 
function (CCF) can be the object of attack anywhere at any time subject to the precautionary 
measures applied to protected individuals. On the other hand, individuals holding a DPH 
status can only be the subject of an attack when they are in the process of taking a direct part 
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in hostilities (i.e. signature behaviour). In other words, the DPH status combines within it the 
character of both a combatant and a civilian depending on what the individual is doing at any 
given point in time. Under their civilian status they are protected from attack in view of the 
principle of distinction. 
 
Signature policies are based on certain behaviours, traits, and characteristics that are 
associated with terrorist activity or conduct. When assessing the legality of such policies 
there are two questions to satisfy: first, was the particular signature policy sufficient from a 
legal perspective to establish an acceptable object or target? Secondly, was the evidence 
sufficient to verify that the individual or object targeted was engaging in the signature 
behaviour? It must therefore be shown that the signature policy is legal under international 
humanitarian law subject to the aforementioned distinction requirements. Once satisfied that 
the policy is legal the next step must be to examine the factual question. The factual question 
requires that verification must be attained and the commanding officer must ensure that the 
action taken is against a military objective. These two questions are also subject to 
precautionary measures, presumptions and protections afforded to civilians and civilian 
objects. Failure to prove the legality of the first question or the evidentiary burden of the 
second would make any attack illegal. 
 
The scholar Kevin J. Heller has carried out a comprehensive review of 14 different US 
signature policies that government officials have indicated are in accordance with 
international humanitarian law and the principle of distinction.
46
 Some of these policies will 
now be assessed in light of the principle of distinction. 
 
  
                                                          
46
 Kevin Jon Heller, „One Hell of a Killing Machine‟ Signature Strikes and International Law‟ JICJ 
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6. Legal Signature Policies: Case Studies 
6.1   Individuals who are in the process of planning attacks:  
Such individuals or groups of individuals have been targeted under US signature policies.
47
  
The US routinely targets men whose identities are unknown while they plot attacks against 
US interests or the interests of its allies. Under international humanitarian law such a policy is 
legal because such targets satisfy the elements for taking a „direct part in hostilities‟. The 
purpose of a signature strike or attack in this case is to adversely affect the military operations 
of the terrorists, thus satisfying the threshold of harm required. There is a direct causal link 
between planning a strike which is aimed at stopping a terrorist attack and the adverse effect 
it would have, in that strike is specifically designed to have an adverse effect to the detriment 
of one belligerent against another (i.e. by disrupting terrorist activity). Such pre-emptive 
strikes are used by the US in order to prevent imminent attacks from terrorist groups.
48
 As 
such they can be considered to be a legal signature policy. 
 
6.2   Persons transporting weaponry:  
The US has also targeted individuals transporting weapons.
49
 When surveillance reveals the 
transportation of weaponry, the vehicle may be directly targeted. However, if a civilian is 
transporting the weapons they would not be considered to be directly taking part in hostilities. 
This is because the act of transporting weapons from one point to another (except 
transporting them to the frontline) will not have satisfied the direct causal link requirement 
because there are too many steps from the transportation to the use of the weapons.
50
 
However, the transportation of weapons is considered to be a military objective under Article 
52(2) of the API. These weapons and vehicles by their nature, location, purpose or use make 
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an effective contribution to the military action and its total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralisation would create a definite military advantage to the attacker.
51
 The weapons make 
an effective contribution to military action by their nature, and the trucks transporting the 
weapons through their use make a contribution to the military action. Hence such an attack 
would be considered under international humanitarian law to be a legal signature policy. 
 
6.3   Individuals handling explosives:  
Such persons have been targeted by the signature policies of the US. People who make or 
assemble bombs
52
 and individuals loading or unloading explosives from vehicles are 
targeted.
53
 Similar to weapons which are being transported, individuals handling explosives 
would only be taking a direct part in hostilities if their actions are not too remote or if the 
bombs are about to be used in carrying out an attack, thereby establishing a direct causal link 
between their activities and harm. By virtue of their very nature, explosives (like weapons) 
make an effective contribution to military action and their destruction is therefore 
permissible. Targeting this group of persons is thus considered to be a legal signature policy. 
 
6.4   Terrorist compounds and military facilities:  
Compounds and facilities belonging to terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda have also 
been the target of US signature policies. In order for such an attack to be considered legal the 
compound must be known to be an Al-Qaeda compound or a facility used for the purposes of 
conducting terrorist activities;
54
 this should be supported by evidence which identifies the 
object as a compound or facility belonging to Al-Qaeda or other terrorist organisation. In 
principle facilities or objects that are by their nature used exclusively for military purposes 
may be attacked at any time. However, if they are civilian objects occasionally used for 
military purposes they can only be attacked at such a time when they are in use for a direct 
military purpose. This is because at a time when they are not being used for a military 
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purpose they do not make an effective contribution to military action. If such a facility is 
attacked when it is being used for military or combat purposes, the attack would thus be 
considered to be a legal signature policy. 
 
6.5   Terrorist training camps:  
Training camps belonging to terrorist organisations have been targeted by the US.
55
 Similarly 
to compounds, evidence must clearly show that the camps or facilities in question are 
terrorist` training camps. Training camps make an effective contribution to military action by 
providing recruits with the combat skills they need to fight effectively. The destruction of 
such facilities would provide a military advantage to the attacker and for this reason such an 
attack is considered to be legal. 
 
7 Illegal Signature Policies 
Having examined examples of what would amount to legal signature policies under the rules 
of international humanitarian law which govern armed conflict, it is now proposed to 
progress the discussion on to illegal signature policies, their nature and some pertinent 
examples.  
 
7.1   Military Aged Male (‘MAM’)  
Men of military age (20-40 years old) in an area known for terrorist activity have in the past 
been the target of drones armed with hellfire missiles. Under US signature policies, all men 
of military or combat age who are inside a strike zone area are presumed to be combatants 
and are therefore targeted unless intelligence proves otherwise. The rationale or reason for 
this signature policy is based on the simple logic that men of military age in an area under the 
control of militants are „…probably up to no good.‟
 56
  
 
However, the basis for this logic is very questionable in that it seems to be far too 
presumptuous. It is for this reason that many commentators have been highly critical of such 
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a signature policy.
57
 The status of an individual cannot, and should not, be inferred simply 
due to their geographical location at any particular point in time. Other criteria used for the 
„MAM‟ signature policy such as the gender, age or any other abstract affiliations of the 
targeted individual appear to be both arbitrary and subjective. There is also the technical 
problem relating to a drone operator‟s ability to accurately determine the age group of a 
target simply from the video streaming of images relayed to the base station by a drone. It 
could thus be argued that such a policy is inconsistent with the international humanitarian law 
principle of distinction which requires that status-based targeting of an individual should be 
based on clear evidence which identifies the target as having membership of an organised 
armed group. Furthermore, for such a signature policy to be considered legal, the targeted 
individual must come under the category of someone who is in a continuing combatant 
function. It is therefore for this reason that a status-based signature policy which relies 
exclusively on criteria such as geographical location, gender and age of the targeted 
individual (without further evidence to show that the individual in question is taking a direct 
part in hostilities or is in a continuing combatant function) is widely considered to be 
unlawful under the rules of international humanitarian law which apply to armed conflicts. 
 
7.2   Consorts  
Individuals who regularly associate themselves or „consort‟ with known militants have been 
the target of US signature policies in the „war against terror‟.
58
 Similar to „MAM‟, targeting 
people who are consorting with known militants or terrorists can be considered to be illegal. 
It is clearly the case that associating or consorting does not qualify as taking a direct part in 
combat activities or hostilities. It could be argued that association or consorting with known 
terrorists is unlikely to adversely affect efforts or military operations aimed at combating 
terrorism. From a legal point of view there is no causal link between consorting and an 
adverse effect on said military operations. Furthermore, consorting is not specifically 
intended or designed to have any adverse impact on one belligerent against another.   
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Consorting does not contribute in any way to the terrorist effort. As such only war or 
terrorism sustaining activities such as supporting the movement or hiding of weapons, or civil 
disobedience which may amount to indirect participation can justify a strike under signature 
policies. Association with known terrorist or consorting, even if it amounts to sympathising 
with the terrorists‟ cause, does not make an individual targetable although they could be the 
subject of a prosecution under relevant national laws.
59
 The UN has confirmed that as long as 
individuals do not participate directly in combat they maintain their civilian status and 
protections.
60
 In the case of Fofana v. Kondewa the Special Court for Sierra Leone ruled that 
collaborating with armed groups does not make an individual targetable. Likewise, indirectly 
supporting or failing to resist an invading force does not make someone a participant in 
hostilities.
61
 It is on these grounds that a signature policy which targets associates and 
consorts of terrorist would be considered to be illegal and a breach of the principles of 
international humanitarian law. 
 
7.3   Armed convoys of men 
Armed men travelling in a convoy of vehicles in an Al-Qaeda controlled area are considered 
to be targetable under US signature policies.
62
  This signature policy is similar to that of 
MAM (above); unless there is additional information to prove the individual‟s participation 
status they are not targetable. Being armed in an Al-Qaeda controlled area or as part of a 
convoy does not qualify as a continuing combatant function or as taking a direct part in 
hostilities. This means that unless there is additional information or evidence of individual or 
group participation in a combat function, armed convoy is not targetable from a legal point of 
view.  This is because the simple fact of a convoy consisting of armed men does not satisfy 
the criteria or threshold of harm, direct causality, or belligerent nexus requirements. 
Individuals or groups of armed men in conflict areas could be armed for self-protection or 
self-defence. In the case of Simic it was held that possession of weapons in itself does not 
establish reasonable doubt as to civilian status of the possessor.
63
 It can therefore be deduced 
from the judgement in this case that civilian status presumption would apply to men in an 
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armed convoy. The targeting of such a convoy under a signature strike policy would thus be 
illegal and therefore a breach of international humanitarian law.  
 
7.4   Suspicious camps or facilities in areas under the control of terrorists:  
These are also viewed as legitimate signature targets under US policy on the war against 
terror.
64
 However, it could be argued that a policy based on suspicion alone without any 
further substantial or corroborating evidence is not in line with the international humanitarian 
law principle of distinction. Furthermore, international humanitarian law requires that when 
an object which is usually used for a civilian purpose comes under suspicion and the 
opposing belligerent is in doubt of its participation in military activities then there is a 
presumption that it has civilian status.
65
 The mere „suspicion‟ of the use of an object does not 
provide sufficient evidence to make it a military object which may be subject to a legitimate 
attack. In cases of a mere suspicion the commanding officer should request additional 
information or evidence. Attacking such an object without additional reconnaissance would 
be against the API‟s requirement of verification and the taking of precautionary measures.  
 
Such an attack would therefore be considered prima facie to be an illegal signature policy and 
a breach of the protection principle of international humanitarian law. 
 
8 Signature Policies which are Potentially Illegal 
Armed men travelling towards an active conflict zone or war theatre may be the subject of 
an attack under the signature policies operated by the US in the war against terror.
66
 This is a 
variant of the signature policies which targets military aged men or armed men travelling in a 
convoy in a conflict zone. A person or persons travelling towards an active combat zone or 
towards the presumed target of a terrorist attack can only be considered as taking a direct part 
in hostilities if such travel is integral to a specific military act or terrorist operation. In other 
words, an attack on such a person or persons under a signature policy will only be legal if it 
can be proven that they are travelling towards a particular destination for the purpose of 
engaging in a specific hostile act. On the other hand, if the person or persons in question are 
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suspected of having an intention to participate in combating operations or in a terrorist act 
only at some time in the future, a signature strike on them would be potentially illegal. In 
light of the civilian status presumption, when in doubt, it would require extra information, 
evidence or intelligence on the basis of which a signature strike may be justified.  
 
Individuals operating a terrorist training camp may be a target under a signature policy.
67
 
In principle, trainers can be attacked anywhere at any time if they can be proven to be 
exercising a continuing combat function in as much as they are members of the terrorist 
group. However, the training of terrorists does not automatically confer on the trainer the 
status of a continuing combat function. There must be further evidence or proof that the 
trainer is involved in additional activities which constitute direct participation in hostilities, 
coupled with extra evidence to prove their membership of the terrorist organisation. Training 
individuals for a specific hostile act amounts to taking a direct part in hostilities as there is a 
direct causal link with the harm intended and such training is specifically designed in support 
of one belligerent against another. The precise nature of the combatant status of „taking a 
direct part in hostilities‟ means that a person may be targeted only at such a time when they 
are engaging in hostilities. This means that when acting as a trainer a person may only be 
directly targeted when deploying to training, when returning from training or while at training 
because at this time they would be directly engaging in hostilities.
68
 This signature policy 
would thus be legal if the signature strike is launched within the timeframe constraints 
imposed by the DPH concept (i.e. if the trainer can be proven to be actively taking part in 
hostilities through his training functions). Any signature strike conducted on a trainer outside 
the timeframe constraint would render such a signature policy potentially illegal and a breach 
of the international humanitarian law principle of distinction. 
 
Persons undergoing training for the purpose of joining a terrorist group are sometimes 
targeted under US signature policies.
69
 When an individual is recruited, continuously trained 
and equipped by a terrorist group to participate directly in hostilities on behalf of the group, 
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these individuals can be considered to have the status of a continuing combatant function 
together with their membership of a terrorist organisation. However, such individuals ought 
to be distinguished from reservist who after basic training leave active duty and reintegrate 
themselves into civilian life. Reservists are considered civilians until such a time that they re-
enter active duty.
70
 For a signature attack on a trainee outside the training camp to be legal, it 
must be shown that the individual was training for a specific military operation and the 
individual has previously taken direct part in hostilities 
 
US signature policies include the targeting of individuals who facilitate terrorist activity.
71
 
However, persons who raise money for terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda are not 
targeted through signature policies.
72
 US policy in this regard therefore appears to be 
contradictory and inconsistent in its practice, as it could be argued that raising funds for a 
terrorist organisation is equivalent to facilitating the activities of such an organisation. In any 
event, under international humanitarian law if facilitators are targeted, such an attack could 
be potentially unlawful. Facilitation which may qualify as taking a direct part in hostilities 
(such as providing ammunition to fighters during hostilities, or acting as a guide) could 
provide the basis for a lawful signature strike.
73
 However, it could be argued that other 
facilitations in the form of sustaining activities do not qualify as taking a direct part in 
hostilities. This will include persons with a media or publicity role, engaging in international 
political or diplomatic relations on behalf of a terrorist group, engaging in hostage/ ransom 
negotiations for the group, supplying fighters with food, providing lodging, or financial 
support. However it seems that the US considers such actions as amounting to taking direct 
part in hostilities.
74
 Such a view, if embedded as part of a signature policy, would be 
considered to be too broad and could potentially render the signature policy illegal under 
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international humanitarian law.
75
 This is in view of the fact that such facilitators are most 
likely to satisfy the criterion of civilian status and are therefore subject to protection under the 
international humanitarian law principle of distinction. The right action to take would be to 
prosecute them under relevant national anti-terror laws rather than to target them with a 
signature strike. 
 
Under the signature policies operated by the US government, any locations which are 
classified as ‘rest areas’ for combatants are equally considered to be legitimate targets for 
signature strikes. However, from an objective point of view, very much would depend on the 
precise meaning of „rest areas‟ and nature of the facility involved. If the rest facilities take the 
form of military barracks, then it could be argued that these are by their very nature used for 
military purposes as they contribute to military action. Their destruction would therefore 
provide a decisive military advantage. Hence they can be legally targeted. However, if the 
facility in question is a civilian dwelling which is occasionally used by militants as a rest or 
recreational area, it could argued that it should not be targeted. The targeting of rest areas 
under a signature policy can therefore be said to be potentially illegal. 
 
9 Conclusion 
The global war against terror is one of the most important challenges facing humanity in the 
modern era. Terrorism has the potential to cause significant damage to human society and to 
international economic and political relations. Finding a solution to this modern day scourge 
requires effective military and political strategies as well as effective legal responses. From a 
legal perspective, two main problems have been identified in this paper as posing potential 
obstacles to the effectiveness of the global war against terror. The first of these is the problem 
of definition. The successful prosecution of terror suspects requires as a pre-requisite a 
universally accepted definition of the words „terrorism‟ and „terrorist‟. Without this different 
countries and different national jurisdictions will continue to operate by different and 
sometimes conflicting standards. 
 
The second challenge is associated with the military strategy which is currently been 
deployed in the war against terror. This challenge relates to the international humanitarian 
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law and international criminal law implications of military operations conducted under 
signature strike policies.  It has to be acknowledged that drone operators have a very difficult 
task to perform. Saddled with the heavy burden of protecting society from terror attacks, they 
have to make very quick and difficult decisions. Quite often they are working under a great 
deal of pressure trying to take preventative action with a view to disrupting terrorist activity 
while operating under the inquiring shadow of international humanitarian law.  They know 
fully well that many commentators (armed with the benefit of hindsight which they, the drone 
operators, do not have), will call into question particular incidents which have resulted from 
the execution of signature policies. They must therefore strike a delicate balance between 
taking action to foil what they believe to be terrorist activity and compliance with the rules of 
armed conflict as laid down under international humanitarian law. It is for this reason that 
they ought to be given recognition and credit for the difficult job which they do. Finally, there 
is a pressing need for uniform, consistent and universally accepted rules and standards for the 
use of signature policies in the global war against terror. The challenge posed by terrorism 
requires effective response from the international community. In the conception, design and 
implementation of policies aimed at providing this response, the potential impact of the war 
against terror on human rights and religious freedoms also needs to be carefully considered.  
 
